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Abstract: 
In the post-Asian crisis period, bank loans to the manufacturing sector have shown a slow recovery 
in the affected countries, unexceptionally in the Philippines. This paper provides a literacy survey on 
the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s monetary policy and the responsiveness of the financial 
market, and discusses on the future works necessary to better understand the monetary policy 
effectiveness in the Philippines. 
As the survey shows, most previous works focus on the correlation between the short-term policy 
rates and during the period of monetary tightening and relatively less interest in quantitative 
effectiveness. Future tasks would shed lights on (1) the asset side – other than loan outstanding – of 
banks to analyze their behavior/preference in structuring portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts 
during the monetary easing period. 
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The Central Bank and Bank Credits in the Philippines: 
A Survey on Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and Its Measures1 
 
Chie Kashiwabara 
 
 
Abstract: 
In the post-Asian crisis period, bank loans to the manufacturing sector have shown a slow 
recovery in the affected countries despite that the main external financing source is bank credits. 
The situation is unexceptionally the same in the Philippines. This paper provides a literature 
survey on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s monetary policy and the responsiveness of the 
financial markets, and discusses on the future works necessary to better understand the 
monetary policy effectiveness in the Philippines. 
The survey shows that previous works mostly focus on the correlation between the short-term 
policy rates and the banks’ interest rates during the period of monetary tightening, thus they are 
less interested in the financial sector’s behaviors. On the other hand, the author finds other 
policy measures affect banks’ asset structure including loans. Therefore, future studies needs to 
shed light on (1) the asset side – other than loan outstanding – of banks to analyze the behavior 
in structuring their portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts during the monetary easing 
period. 
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1 The paper is prepared for the research project “Monetary Policy Infrastructure and the Policy 
Responses in the Southeast Asian Developing Countries” as an interim/preliminary study, 
supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research of Japan Society for Promotion of 
Science, for the FY 2012-2014. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the common features in the Southeast Asian financial sectors in the post-Asian 
currency/financial crisis period is a sluggish recovery of bank credits to the industrial sector, 
especially to the manufacturing. The manufacturing sector has been the main driving force of 
economic development in the region. Similar situation can be observed in the Philippines, where 
the influence of the Asian crisis and the recent global recession has been deemed moderate 
compared with the neighboring economies. 
As a recent example, the then-Arroyo administration (2004-2010) took a series of monetary 
easing in 2009 to stimulate lending to the export industries under the Economic Resiliency Plan 
at the onset of the global recession. Major measures applied were the interest rate (overnight 
lending rate in the interbank market) cuts three times a year totaled by 2 percentage points to the 
historically low level since 1992, and increasing of the BSP’s rediscounting resources. However, 
loans outstanding to the manufacturing sector had decreased from PhP392.8 billion in 
December 2009 to PhP327.0 billion in December 2010 even though the total loans outstanding 
increased from PhP1,748.2 billion to PhP1,921.7 billion during the same period. 
Therefore, to better understand the Philippines’ monetary policy infrastructure and its 
effectiveness, it is necessary to review the policy setting and previous works on the BSP’s 
monetary policy, and also to discuss about the additional data and/or its correlations regarding 
BSP’s monetary policy changes. This paper aims to find some discussion clues to the following 
questions: How the BSP has reviewed and assessed its own policy measures? On what effects in 
the economy has the BSP put importance? What are missed or less weighed in analyzing the 
policy effectiveness? The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section briefs BSP’s 
mandate and its policy measures under the New Central Bank Act, considering Philippines’ 
industrial structure and economic setting; section 3 provides a literature survey on the BSP’s 
monetary policy measures and effectiveness of its credit channel; section 4 summarizes the 
survey and extends discussions to improve analyzing the bank behavior – providing loans, 
choosing asset portfolios, etc. – for a better understanding of corporate financing and industrial 
development in the Philippines. 
 
 
2. Monetary Policy Measures and Its Infrastructure in the Philippines 
 
2.1  Central Bank objectives and the legal/institutional framework 
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the central bank of the Philippines, thereafter the BSP) 
formally adopted inflation targeting as the framework for monetary policy in January 2002, 
when the Republic Act No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act, thereafter RA 7653) was enacted. 
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The policy move is aimed at providing the BSP with a more focused approach in pursuit of its 
primary mandate, which is to promote price stability, i.e. a low and stable inflation, conducive to 
the country’s balanced and sustainable economic growth. Two intrinsic features of the approach 
– transparency and accountability in monetary policy – are as well expected to enhance the 
credibility of the BSP in helping create a stable macroeconomic environment in RA 7653. 
This approach involves the announcement of an explicit inflation target to achieve over a 
given time period,2 which is set and announced jointly by the BSP and the government through 
an inter-governmental agency body, the Monetary Board. Although the responsibility of 
achieving the target rests primarily with the BSP, this joint announcement reflects active 
government participation in achieving the goal of price stability and government ownership of 
the inflation target. Under RA 7653, the BSP created an Advisory Committee which deliberates, 
discusses and recommends to the Monetary Board the appropriate monetary policy stance that 
will enable the BSP to achieve the desired inflation target. The Advisory Committee meets 
every six weeks (eight times a year). 
 
2.2  Policy measures 
Similar to the central banks in other countries, the BSP adopts the interest rates applied on 
the overnight Repurchase Agreements (RPs) and Reverse Repurchase Agreement (RRPs) 
through open market operations (OMO) as a signal of BSP’s stance on monetary policy. At the 
same time, the BSP implements monetary policy using direct and indirect instruments to 
influence the level of liquidity in the market and thereby achieve inflation to the target level. 
These instruments can be classified into four types: open market operations, acceptance of 
fixed-term deposits (Special Deposit Account: SDA), standing facilities (rediscounting and BSP 
loans), reserve requirements, and moral suasion (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: BSP Policy Measures 
Direct Measures 
Quantitative 
and/or 
Price Signals 
Reserve requirements 
Rediscounting and BSP loans 
Acceptance of SDA 
Oral advice Moral suasion 
Indirect Measures Open market operations (RPs and RRPs) 
     Source) BSP website. 
 
                                               
2 Consistent with the inflation targeting framework, the Monetary Board announced in July 
2010 the BSP’s shift to a fixed inflation target for the medium term of three years (currently for 
2012-2014, 3-5 percent), approved by the Development Budget Coordination Committee 
(DBCC) on 9 July 2010 under DBCC Resolution No. 2010-3. 
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Direct instruments: Those enable the BSP to directly control certain items in banks’ 
balance sheets, which may be in the form of financial prices or quantities and at the same time, 
have a strong coercive element. First, reserve requirements, which refer to the percentage of 
bank deposits and deposit substitute liabilities that banks must keep on hand or in deposits with 
the BSP, have a significant effect on money supply in the banking system. Those are applied to 
peso demand, savings, time deposit and deposit substitutes (including long-term non-negotiable 
tax-exempt certificates of time deposits: LTNCTDs) of universal and commercial banks, in the 
form of cash in vault, deposits with the BSP and government securities. To correct banks’ 
reserve requirements, call money are traded in the interbank call loan market that correspond to 
the excess or deficiency of each bank in terms of reserves. As the reserve position of each bank 
or quasi-bank is calculated on the daily basis, these can be overnight placements. The interbank 
market can either be securitized (collateralized) or unsecuritized (clean) lendings/borrowings, as 
well as repurchase agreements. Repurchase Agreements (RPs) are generally short-term sale of 
government securities with an agreement to repurchase on the agreed maturity date through 
credit lines with its counterparties for these transactions. 
Secondly, in order to influence the credit volume in the financial system and help banks 
meet temporary liquidity needs, the BSP applies rediscounting as a standing credit facility to 
qualified banks. It allows those banks to refinance the loans they extend to their clients, by 
borrowing money from the BSP using promissory notes and other loan papers as collateral. In 
addition to the peso rediscounting facility, the BSP introduced the Exporters’ Dollar and Yen 
Rediscounting Facility in 1995. 
Third, the BSP also accepts deposits from banks. The Special Deposit Account (SDA) 
facility functions as fixed-term deposits by financial institutions with the BSP, introduced in 
November 1998 to expand BSP’s instruments in liquidity management. In April 2007, 
especially for a better controlling of strong foreign exchange inflows, the BSP allowed trust 
entities to deposit in the SDA facility.  
Fourth, the BSP can employ moral suasion as a last resort when existing market 
mechanisms cannot adequately and promptly ensure the attainment of specific monetary 
objectives. This suasion has been employed for BSP’s guidance other than its monetary policy 
as well. 
 
Indirect instruments: Indirect instruments include adjustment in short-term policy interest 
rates and the conduct of OMOs of the government securities3. It involves the BSP publicly 
                                               
3 Unlike some cases in other countries, RA 7653 does not allow the BSP to issue any type of 
“the central bank bond/note,” due to the past experience that the old central bank had financed 
the central government’s deficits by issuing notes and bills under the Marcos administration. 
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buying or selling government securities from banks and financial institutions in order to expand 
or contract the supply of money. When the BSP buys securities, it pays for them by directly 
crediting its counterparty’s Demand Deposit Account (DDA), maintained with the BSP. 
Effectively, the transaction increases the buyer’s level of reserves and on an aggregate level, 
expands the system’s money supply. Conversely, when the BSP sells the securities, the buyer’s 
payment (via direct debit against the buyer’s DDA) reduces its reserve account causing money 
supply to contract. In conducting OMO, the BSP uses two instruments: (1) repurchase 
(repo)/reverse repurchase (reverse repo) agreements (RPs and RRPs), and (2) outright purchases 
and sales of securities. 
The BSP defines OMO as the most practical tool among its policy measures with the 
reasons of OMO’s greater flexibility in terms of the amount and timing of intervention and 
quick results which OMO yields. Any change in the policy rates is readily implemented, i.e., on 
the same day that the Monetary Board makes the resolution, thus any effect on the market 
becomes evident. On the other hand, as all OMO is undertaken only with the government 
securities, the BSP needs to manage the credit risk of eligible securities. Those securities are 
valued based on their current market yields as well as the applicable cut based on remaining life 
of securities involved. To avoid exposing the BSP to undue risks arising from purchases of 
securities, Section 91, Article V of RA 7653 sets the type of securities that can be used in OMO 
transactions as follows: (1) with evidences of indebtedness issued by the central government or 
by its political subdivisions; and (2) with evidences of indebtedness issued by government 
instrumentalities and fully guaranteed by the central government. As well, Section 92 of Article 
V also provides the BSP with effective instruments for OMO. The BSP may issue, place, buy 
and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the BSP, subject to such rules and 
regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the principles stated in 
Section 90. However, such issuance shall be made only in cases of extraordinary movement in 
price levels. Said evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the international 
reserves of the BSP or against securities. 
 
 
3. A Survey of Previous Works on the Effectiveness of BSP’s Policy Measures 
 
Literature on the monetary policy mechanism in the Philippines has not been abundant, 
except for the studies conducted by the BSP economists and some Philippine academics. With 
                                                                                                                                         
Thus, all RP/RRP transactions today are conducted with the Treasury notes and bills issued by 
the Bureau of Treasury (BTr), Department of Finance, the central government of the 
Philippines. 
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the methodologies and models applied to the cases in developed countries (see, e.g., Bernanke, 
Lauback, Mishkin and Posen [1999], Bernanke and Gertler [1995], Mishkin [1996], Mishkin 
and Posen [1997], Bayoumi and Melander [2008]), their main interest is deemed to exist on to 
what extent and how long a monetary policy tightening affects domestic economic activities. 
Based on the main analysis scope and objectives of the previous works, this section deals with 
three major objectives as the following: BSP’s monetary policy change and responsiveness of 
the credit markets, the relations between monetary policy and exchange rate, and the changes in 
profitability of the banking sector. 
 
3.1  Impacts of BSP’s monetary policy and responsiveness of the credit markets 
Appling a series of vector auto-regression (VAR) methodologies, Pobre [2003] analyzes 
the responsiveness and magnitude of the interest rates, the outputs and the credit market 
conditions in South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines caused by policy shocks (monetary 
tightening) from the first quarter 1981 to the third quarter 2000. It finds out that in the 
Philippines, (1) tighter conditions (higher lending rate) in the credit market persist longer, and 
(2) the external finance premium (interest-rate premiums to the private sector) is higher. These 
findings suggest that, in the Philippines, risk perception by banks plays a more crucial role in 
influencing their willingness to supply credit than a policy shock itself. Dakila and Claveria 
[2006] also applies the VAR to verify shifts in the direction of causality – from T-bill rate in the 
secondary market to RRP/ERRP (effective RRP) to the opposite – in the pre- and post-inflation 
targeting period January 2000 to March 2006. The study concludes that BSP’s policy rate is the 
most significant determinant of the T-bill rate over the very near term thus the BSP retains its 
capability to influence market interest rates through adjustment of the policy rate. 
Another study also confirms a monetary shock influence on the domestic output and 
investments persists longer. Dakila and Paraso [2005] uses a vector error correlation (VER) 
model, concentrating on the interest rate channel, to validate the results of BSP’s monetary 
policy during the period of 1987 and the first quarter of 2003. The paper finds that the negative 
impacts (decrease in the aggregate) on investments and GDP growth last longer than that on the 
short-term interest rate (the 91-day T-bill rate) due to a policy change.  
On the other hand, some are focusing on changes on the aggregate of credit to the private 
sector. For example, with a similar methodology to Pobre [2003] and Bayoumi and Melander 
[2008], Bayangos [2010a] conducts co-efficiency analyses among a raising of overnight RRP 
rate due to expectations of increasing inflation, real bank lending rate and aggregate of credit to 
the private sector and real output, etc., through the changes in the short-term rate (the 91-day 
T-bill) from March 1999 to December 2010. It finds a one-percentage-point rise in overnight 
RRP causes 0.25 percentage-point change in the 91-day T-bill rate, then a change in the real 
bank lending rate (0.15 percentage point) after a quarter, but the impact on the bank lending rate 
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expands to 0.27 percentage point and stays longer than that on the T-bill rate in the long run. 
Contrary to the changes in T-bill and bank lending rates co-efficiency to the overnight RRP rate, 
that of the aggregate credit shows a mixed result. 
With a different scope applying partial equilibrium analysis, Tuano-Amador, Glindro and 
Claveria [2009] analyzes the relative strength of the monetary policy transmission channels to 
the private sector lending in the pre- and post-inflation targeting period during January 1995- 
January 2008. It finds that the impact of policy rate adjustments on the real economy appears to 
work quite strongly via OMO throughout the examined period, and a gradual strength increase 
in the interest rate pass-through and in the bank lending channels since the inflation targeting 
was introduced. On the contrary, the paper finds the exchange rate pass-through has gone down 
during the inflation targeting period of 2002-2009. Thus the paper concludes that the interest 
rate and bank lending channels need to be strengthened. 
 
3.2  Stability of the exchange rate and monetary/exchange rate policies 
The past Philippine administrations have liberalized its financial regulations since 1994 and 
adopted the floating rate system, and another challenge for the BSP to promote and maintain 
price stability is closely related to managing the peso exchange rate. Like other emerging/ 
developing economies, the peso exchange rate plays an important role in the Philippines’ 
economy through the trade channel. 
Glindro and Estigoy [2006] uses the Vector Error Correction (VEC) approach to analyze the 
exchange rate and interest rate differential (the Philippine 91-day T-bill and five-year T-bond 
rates) dynamics to validate the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) condition,4 in the period of 
2001-2005. To include the notion in Bautista [2006], which emphasizes regime shifts in 
exchange rate policy among developing countries affected by the Asian crisis were the norm, 
the paper added other ASEAN5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) data in addition to 
the US T-bill/bond rate and LIBOR for comparison. The paper’s results generally show that 
interest rate differentials respond more strongly to shocks on the exchange rate by steeper 
response of short-term interest rate, and large interest rate differentials have stronger forecasting 
power for currency movement than small differentials. Though the analysis direction is opposite 
each other, Glindro and Estigoy [2006] and Tuano-Amador, Glindro and Claveria [2009] show 
different results.5 This may be caused by the difference in the analyzed periods or that of data 
                                               
4 The UIRP condition posits that t country should expect its exchange rate to depreciate when 
the nominal interest rate differential widens. 
5 Glindro and Estigoy [2006] explains the paucity of data is due to that of long-run Philippine 
Treasury rate data, which incidentally capture the policy shift to inflation targeting framework. 
The choice of 2001 as the beginning date was because of the availability of a more compete 
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used, which needs more researches to be accumulated. 
On the other hand, Yap [2009] discusses whether the BSP should include the exchange rate 
in its policy objectives or not. Showing the data of SDA outstanding accumulation in the latter 
2000s and applying macroeconometric model, the paper analyzes the increase/decrease of BSP’s 
credibility. The results indicate that incorporating the exchange rate in the reaction function 
improves BSP’s credibility if the exchange rate is included in the objective function. Although 
most central banks with their major objective of inflation targeting and free-float exchange rate 
system, including the BSP, are reluctant to acknowledge that the exchange rate plays a direct 
role of its own monetary policy rule, the paper indicates that BSP intervention in the foreign 
exchange market is to some extent consistent with its inflation-targeting framework. 
 
3.3  Profitability of the banking sector 
Though not so many researches have been conducted, non-BSP economists have had 
interests on changes in the banking sector. Their major objective is to identify how the 
profitability of local banks has changed since the financial liberalization in the mid-1990s, 
which is backed by their recognition that the competition in the domestic credit market has been 
further heightened by foreign banks’ new entrants to the market due to the financial sector 
reforms since the late 1990s. 
Following Berger and Mester [1999], Dacanay III [2010] analyzes the evolution of cost and 
profit efficiency for Philippine commercial banks during the period of 1992-2004, and shows 
Philippine banks experienced a steady declining profit (by 6 percentage points) and rising cost 
efficiencies (by 13 percentage points) after the financial liberalization in 1994 to 2004. It also 
suggests that the banks may have opted for defensive strategies – the “quiet life” hypothesis – 
threatened by new foreign competitors’ entrants in the domestic market, instead of reducing 
their costs. Some earlier studies show similar results: Karim [2001] reports an average of 34.1 
percent cost inefficiency in the banking sector from 1989 to 1996, and Manlagnit and Lamberte 
[2004] explains an average profit inefficiency of 85 percent and cost inefficiency of 39 percent 
from 1990 to 2002. Considering the previous papers’ results together, the evidence which shows 
the credit market competition was additionally increased by the financial sector reforms in the 
post-Asian financial period is not clear. There may be other factors that the local banks have 
opted for lower loans outstanding to the business sector, thus it requires analyses on the asset 
side of local banks to clarify if there exist other financial and non-financial instruments for their 
preference. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
series of five-year Philippine T-bond rate. 
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4. Summary and Discussions for Future Works 
 
4.1  Summary of the previous works 
As seen in the section 3, major researches related to the BSP policy measures discuss about 
(1) the credit market responsiveness in the monetary tightening, and (2) the relation between 
exchange-rate stability and the policy rate change or interest rate disparity with the US T-bill 
rate. Summary of the results of (1) and (2) is wrapped up in Table 2. Based on the their findings, 
it is clear that loans to the private sector has been affected by BSP’s financial tightening more  
strongly than the short-term government securities in terms of both increases in the interest rates 
and periods where higher rates persist. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Researches on the BSP Policy Rate Change and Credit Channels 
Objective 
of Analysis Author(s) Methodology Findings 
Credit 
market 
responsive- 
ness 
Pobre [2003] VAR 
Higher lending rate in the credit market persists longer, 
and the interest-rate premiums to the private sector 
become higher. 
Dakila and 
Claveria [2006] VAR 
BSP’s policy rate is the most significant determinant of 
the T-bill rate over the very near term. The BSP retains 
its capability to influence market interest rates. 
Dakila and 
Paraso [2005] VER 
A policy rate hike influences the aggregate investments 
decrease and GDP growth last longer than the short- 
term interest rate (the 91-day T-bill rate). 
Bayangos 
[2010a] VAR 
A rise in overnight RRP causes a larger and longer rate 
increase in the real bank lending than the 91-day T-bill 
rate. Co-efficiency of the aggregate credit to the 
overnight RRP rate shows a mixed result. 
Tuano-Amador, 
Glindro and 
Claveria [2009] 
Partial 
equili- 
burium 
Impacts of policy rate adjustments on the real economy 
work strongly via OMO, and a gradual strength 
increase in the interest rate and bank lending channels.  
Exchange 
rate and 
monetary/ 
exchange 
rate policy 
Glindro and 
Estigoy [2006] VEC 
Shorter interest rates respond more strongly and 
sharply to shocks on the exchange rate, and large 
interest rate differentials have stronger forecasting 
power for currency movement. 
Tuano-Amador, 
Glindro and 
Claveria [2009] 
Partial 
equili- 
burium 
The exchange rate channel has gone down during the 
inflation targeting period of 2002-2009. 
Yap [2009]  Macro- econometric 
Incorporating the exchange rate in the reaction 
function improves BSP’s policy credibility if the 
exchange rate is included in the objective function. 
 
Another area is the changes in profitability of the local banking sector. Throughout the 
period of starting financial liberalization in 1994 to the post-Asian financial crisis era, 
Philippine banks have lost their profit efficiency continuously according to the previous 
researches. On the other hand, the reason(s) for the local banks’ reluctance to provide credits to 
the private sector, especially the manufacturing, has not been clearly identified. To better 
explain the Philippines’ slow recovery of bank lending/corporate financing in the post-Asian 
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crisis period, it is necessary to analyze the changes in each bank’s asset structure and the 
possibility that some of BSP’s monetary policy measures (described in the section 1) may 
influence on banks’ resource allocation among account items. In the end, those analyses will be 
able to explain and assess the quantitative effectiveness of BSP’s policy changes during 
monetary easing periods, especially since the late 2000s. 
 
4.2 Some factors for further analyses 
In this subsection, the outstanding trends of the SDA and banks’ RRP arrangement are 
reviewed. The reason is those may afford collateral evidences to the banks’ defensive strategies 
(the “quiet life” hypothesis) suggested in Dacanay III [2010], or enable to expand the 
discussions on BSP’s policy measures effectiveness. 
As described in the section 1, the SDA is one of BSP’s alternative policy measures of OMO. 
It was introduced in 1998, and its interest rates had been relatively higher than those of the 
money and interbank markets. According to the BSP’s asset and liability report, the SDA was 
not frequently used until mid-2006. In April 2007, especially for a better controlling of strong 
foreign exchange inflows, the BSP allowed trust entities and government-owned and 
–controlled corporations (GOCCs) to deposit in the SDA facility. In the next month, it also 
decided to allow banks to place cash in the SDA as an alternative to comply with the minimum 
liquidity requirements for government deposits. 
Figure 1 shows the BSP’s liabilities of 2001-2012 (end-year, except for 2012). Among the 
items, the SDA outstanding has drastically increased throughout the latter 2000s. Due to the 
surge of the SDA outstanding and accompanying concern that the SDA has been opted for 
instead of lending, in March 2008 the BSP decided to reorganize the SDA facility as follows: 
(1) closing of the 2, 3, and 6 month periods of depository, (2) lowering the interest rates of the 
rest tenors (shorter than 2-month periods). To date, the SDA outstanding equals to 24 percent of 
the total asset outstanding of the universal and commercial banks,6 and has grown the largest 
item in the BSP’s liability side (40 percent of the total liabilities). Yap [2009: 266] defines the 
SDA since 2006 as an important tool for sterilization. It also refers some analysts’ notion that 
the BSP’s widening access to the SDA to trust entities and GOCCs intended to mop up excess 
liquidity and maintain inflation within the target levels. 
The reference above partly explains the reason that the BSP relaxed access to the SDA 
facility, and seems to fit for analyzing the correlation between the exchange rate policy 
effectiveness and BSP’s credibility in inflation targeting. However, there rise three questions. 
 
                                               
6 Assets of the universal and commercial banks consist more than 90 percent of that of the total 
banking sector. 
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Figure 1: BSP’s Liabilities (end-year) 
 
Note) *Other deposits include: Reserve deposits of other depository corporations and other financial 
institutions, other foreign currency deposits, and other deposits (mostly by GOCCs). 
Source) BSP website. 
 
 
Firstly, the SDA outstanding has steadily increased regardless of its facility changes by the 
BSP. The wider access to the SDA facility provided incentives to the applicable institutions, but 
lowering the SDA rates on the other hand gave disincentives. The outstanding trend represents 
financial institutions’ preference to place their resources in the SDA rather than to allocate in 
other investments and businesses.  
Related to the first question, secondly, it can be raised how and why the banking sector has 
changed their asset side structure in the post-Asian crisis period. In the Philippines, the 
loan-over-deposit ratio has been declining by more than 10 percentage points since the 
late-1990s, despite the increases of deposits and the ratio level is lower than the neighboring 
countries. Though the loans outstanding steadily increased, some part has been offset by the 
RRPs arrangements in mid-2000s, and clearly the outstanding to the manufacturing has been 
decreased until recently (Figure 2). Further analyses are necessary for a better understanding of 
the financial sector’s responses to BSP’s monetary policy through identifying banks’ lending 
preference in the context of their asset management. 
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Figure 2: Universal and Commercial Banks’ Loans Outstanding 
by Industrial Category 
 
Source) BSP website. 
 
 
Thirdly, according to BSP’s asset and liability data, its policy direction of whether easing or 
tightening liquidity seems to differ depending on the policy measures during the two external 
shocks – the Lehman shock and Euro area crises in the latter 2000s. For example, BSP’s net 
RRP arrangements outstanding (the RRP arrangements outstanding on the liability side minus 
the domestic securities on the asset side, referring to the OMO transaction scheme) has been 
increased in 2007-2008 from the level of PhP30 billion to that of PhP60 billion, then turned 
negative in 2009-2010 (Figure 3). The net RRP outstanding moves during the period suggest 
that at the onset of the Lehman shock the BSP took monetary easing. On the contrary, since the 
Euro crisis arose in 2010, the net RRP has been basically negative. While looking at the Loans 
and Advances (in BSP’s asset side), its outstanding level has not shown significant changes 
throughout in either direction in the above period. Therefore, it needs to verify the reasoning of 
these different policy responses: e.g., in 2010 if the BSP recognized the market had been liquid 
enough considering the economic distress abroad. 
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Figure 3: BSP’s Selling/Buying of Securities 
 
Note) Data for 2012 is unaudited. 
Source) BSP website. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The survey of previous works on BSP’s policy measures effectiveness suggests that the 
BSP puts importance on the price/interest rate changes stimulated by the measures taken. As it 
formally adopts inflation targeting as the main objective, the survey results seem natural. But 
on the other hand, in a country where investment and development resources are still much in 
need like the Philippines, it should be adequately assessed if those resources are allocated to 
appropriate sectors. That means further analyses on a policy’s quantitative effectiveness and 
responses from the financial sector are inevitable to better and comprehensively understand the 
Philippines’ situation. For such studies, the following should be in mind: (1) the financial 
institutions’ asset side – other than loan outstanding – to analyze the behavior in structuring 
their portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts during the monetary easing period. 
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